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Abstract. Quantitative security techniques have been proven effective to mea-
sure the security of systems against various types of attackers. However, such
techniques are often tested against small-scale academic examples.
In this paper we use analyze two scalable, real life privacy case studies: the privacy
of the energy consumption data of the users of a smart grid network and the secrecy
of the voters’ voting preferences with different types of voting protocols.
We analyze both case studies with three state-of-the-art information leakage
computation tools: LeakWatch, Moped-QLeak, and our tool QUAIL equipped
with a new trace analysis algorithm. We highlight the relative advantages and
drawbacks of the tools and compare their usability and effectiveness in analyzing
the case studies.
1 Introduction
The protection of privacy and data security is one of the main concerns of computer
science. Security often falls down to the impossibility for an attacker to obtain a given
secret value. Such an impossibility can be defined by non-interference [17]. However
this definition rejects any program which publishes any variable whose value depends
on the secret. For instance, publishing the results of an election when each individual
vote is secret breaks non-interference. Such a yes/no approach does not consider that an
attacker may have a partial information about a secret.
Information-theoretical techniques have the advantage of considering the secret not
as an atomic object but as a known number of secret bits, allowing the definition of
measures of effectiveness of an attack based on the amount of secret bits that the attack
compromises. The amount of secret bits that are compromised by an attack are known
as information leakage. Leakage depends on the information about the secret known
to the attacker before the attack, known as prior information and usually modeled as a
prior probability distribution over the values of the secret. This approach dates back to
Denning [15]. Different information leakage measures have been introduced, including
Shannon leakage [18], min-entropy leakage [29] and the g-leakage [1], encoding different
security properties of the system. All the tools we compare in this work can compute both
Shannon and min-entropy leakage with no significant difference in computation time.
We compare them on the computation of Shannon leakage, but we expect no significant
difference if the tools were to be compared on the computation of of min-entropy leakage.
Among the results in the field, Köpf et al. studied leakage of side-channel attacks
[2,20], while Boreale has defined leakage for process calculi [6] and characterized the
best attack strategy of an adaptive attacker [9].
In this work we compare the three tools that compose the state of the art in Shan-
non leakage computation: QUAIL [5] equipped with a new trace analysis algorithm,
LeakWatch [13], and Moped-QLeak [11].
QUAIL is a recent but already well established tool for precise and exact information
leakage computation, and later tools by multiple authors have used it as comparison
[13,24]. Nonetheless, QUAIL needs to produce a full Markov chain model of the system-
attacker scenario to produce a meaningful result.
The first contribution of this paper is a new algorithm for precise information leak-
age computation, which is able to compute information leakage following the same
Markovian semantics we introduced previously [3, Section 4] by performing a depth-first
search analyzing the execution traces of the system. This avoids building the full Markov
chain model of the system.
LeakWatch is the most recent of a family of tools for statistical approximation of
information leakage developed by Chothia et al. [12,14]. LeakWatch analyzes Java code,
requiring the programmer to annotate the code of the system with secret and observable
values, then simulates the system repeatedly using the Java Virtual Machine and esti-
mates the correlation between the secret and observable values. LeakWatch follows a
different perspective than QUAIL and Moped-QLeak, since LeakWatch computes an
approximated result, contrarily to QUAIL’s arbitrary precision and Moped-QLeak’s fixed
double precision. LeakWatch’s approximation can be improved at the cost of running
more simulations, which is time expensive.
Moped-QLeak [11] uses the Moped tool [16] to compute a symbolic summary of the
program under analysis as an Algebraic Decision Diagram (ADD), and then computes
the leakage using the ADD representation. The symbolic approach is very efficient
when the program can be represented in a compact way using ADDs, and in these cases
Moped-QLeak is significantly faster than the other tools.
In this paper we introduce two scalable case studies for the benchmarking of quanti-
tative information leakage tools. Both case studies arise from real-life privacy problems.
The case studies are anonymity of user data in Smart Grids and privacy comparison in
voting protocols.
Smart Grids are in the family of interconnected objects and have received a growing
interest over the last years. Our case study is based on a real system deployed at fortiss1
labs [21]. In our case study, we focus on the negotiation between a set of prosumers and
an aggregator. The prosumers (PROducer conSUMERs) consume, store and produce
energy. To stabilize the grid, the prosumers negotiate with the aggregator how much
energy they will exchange with the grid for the next period of time. This exchange
might expose the consumption of one of the prosumers, and, in turn, allow a potential
attacker to deduce that a house is empty or that a factory has increased its production. In
that example, the difficulty is to decide not only whether the exact information can be
deduced or not, but also how well an attack can approximate it. Measuring the leakage
indicates how much of the secret is unveiled through the negotiation phase. We show
that increasing the number of prosumers also increases security.
In the voting protocols comparison case study, we compare two different voting
protocols: the Single Preference, where each voter expresses a single vote for his favorite
1 http://fortiss.org
2
candidate, and the Preference Ranking, where each voter ranks all candidates from his
most to his least favorite. In both cases there are multiple voters and candidates, and the
secret is the preference of each voter. Both protocols have a large number of possible
secrets and outputs, so they become cumbersome to analyze even with a small number
of voters and candidates.
We compare the tools on their computation time, precision of the answer returned,
scalability and usability. Since no tool works strictly better than the others in all category,
we determine the problem classes that are better suited to be analyzed by each tool.
2 Background: Information Leakage
The information leakage of a program is a measure quantifying how much information an
attacker infers about the program’s secret by observing the program’s output. We assume
that the attacker has access to the program’s source code, unlimited computational power,
and some prior information about the secret (e.g. the bit size of the secret). Leakage
corresponds to the reduction in the attacker’s uncertainty about the secret.
Let h be a random variable with values in a domainD(h) representing the value of the
secret and o be a random variable with values in a domainD(o) modeling the value of the
output. The information the attacker has on the secret is modeled by a discrete probability
distribution, i.e. for a discrete random variable X a function pi : D(X) → [0, 1] such
that
∑
x∈D(X) pi(x) = 1. The information that the attacker has on the secret before the
attack is modeled by the prior distribution pi(h) while the information the attacker has
after observing the output is modeled by the posterior distribution pi(h|o). We consider
the prior distribution as given, since it is part of the model of the attacker. Let U be an
uncertainty measure defined on probability distributions, including Shannon entropy,
min-entropy, and g-vulnerability. Computing leakage for the measure U reduces to
computing the prior and posterior distributions and applying the formula
LeakageU = U(pi(h))− U(pi(h|o)) (1)
= U(pi(h))−
∑
o¯∈D(o)
pi(o = o¯)U(pi(h|o = o¯)) (2)
In this work we want to compute Shannon leakage, and thus we use Shannon entropy
as the measure of uncertainty: U(pi(x)) =
∑
x∈D(X) pi(x) log2 pi(x)
3 Quantitative Information Leakage Tools
We introduce the quantitative information leakage computation tools that will be tested
on the case studies.
3.1 QUAIL
QUAIL [5] computes Shannon and min-entropy leakage of a program written in an
imperative WHILE language. The language allows the user to program naturally with
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constants, arrays, and loops, and QUAIL compiles such language in an if-goto Markovian
semantics. Given the prior information of the attacker, QUAIL represents the program as
a Markov chain, and computes the information leakage from the Markov chain with an
arbitrary number of precision digits.
Syntax We present the syntax of the QUAIL imperative language we use to model
programs. We distinguish the variables in public and private variables according to their
level of abstraction: public variables have precise values, while private variables have
sets of possible values. The observable variable o is public, while the secret variable
h is private. Let v (resp.h) range over names of public (resp. private) variables and x
range over reals from [0; 1]. Let L (resp. H) be the set of assignments of values to public
variables (resp. sets of values to private variables). Assume that the secret is a private
variable h taking values in a known domain D(h) and the observable is a public variable
o taking values in a known domain D(o).
Let label denote program points and f (g) pure arithmetic (Boolean) expressions.
Assume a standard set of expressions and the following statements:
stmt ::= public intn v:=k | private intn h | v := f(L) | v := rand x |
skip | goto label | return | if g(L,H) then goto la
else goto lb
The first statement declares a public variable v of size n bits with a given value k,
while the second statement similarly declares a private variable h of size n bits with
allowed values ranging from 0 to 2n− 1. The third statement assigns to a public variable
the value of expression f depending on public variables; assignment to private variables
or depending on the value of private variables is not allowed. The fourth statement
assigns zero with probability x, and one with probability 1−x, to a public variable. The
return statement outputs values of all public variables and terminates. A conditional
branch first evaluates an expression g dependent on private and public variables, and it
jumps to label la if g is true and to label lb otherwise.
Since only a single variable scope exists, loops can be added in a standard way as
syntactic sugar.
As a contribution, we present a method to compute information leakage of a program
by analyzing the execution traces of the program. We introduce the Markovian semantics
of our langage by means of a function computing the successors of each state. Then we
explain how we perform a depth-first exploration of the traces of the system, obtaining a
set Q of final states that represent all possible output states of the system. Finally, we
show how to compute the posterior entropy from Q.
Semantics The Markovity of the semantics allows us to define states containing enough
information to determine a probability distribution over all traces originating from any
state.
Definition 1. A state in a Markovian semantics is a tuple (pc, L,H, p) where pc ∈ N0
is the program counter, L an assignment function assigning a value to each public
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pc: public intn v := k
succ(pc, L,H, p) = {(pc + 1, L ∪ {(L(v) = k, n)}, H, p)}
pc: private intn h
succ(pc, L,H, p) = {(pc + 1, L,H ∪ {H(h) = {0, ..., 2n − 1}, n)}, p)}
pc: skip
succ(pc, L,H, p) = {(pc + 1, L,H, p)}
pc: v := f(L)
succ(pc, L,H, p) = {(pc + 1, L ∪ {(L(v) = f(L), n)}, H, p)}
pc: v := rand x
succ(pc, L,H, p) = {(pc + 1, L(v) = 0, H, p · x), (pc + 1, L(v) = 1, H, p · (1− x))}
pc: goto label
succ(pc, L,H, p) = {(label, L,H, p)}
pc: return
succ(pc, L,H, p) = ∅
pc: if g(L,H) then goto la else goto lb
succ(pc, L,H, p) = {(la, L,H|g(L,H), p · Pr(g(L,H)|pi(h))),
(lb, L,H|¬g(L,H), p · Pr(¬g(L,H)|pi(h)))}
Fig. 1: Successor function for each state in the Markovian trace semantics.
variable, H an assignment function assigning a set of values to each private variable,
and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 is the probability of the state.
The initial state of the semantics is (1, ∅, ∅, 1). The set of successor states of a state
(pc, L,H, p) depends on the statement pointed at by the program counter pc. States
pointing to a return statement have 0 successors, states pointing to a rand or if
statement have up to 2 successors, and any other state has 1 successor. The successor
function defining the semantics of the language is shown in Figure 1. If a state has
zero probability, e.g. when a conditional is always true, it is removed from the set of
successors.
We call a state final if it has no successors, meaning that the program counter of
the state points to a return statement. The trace analysis terminates when a final
state is encountered. This means that the analysis terminates if and only if the program
under analysis terminates, so non-terminating programs cannot be analyzed with this
technique. Non-termination of the program under analysis raises other issues in leakage
computation [4], and is not considered here.
Conditional states and random assignment states have two successors. The successors
of a conditional state correspond to the guard being true or false. Since the guard can
depend on the secret, both successor states may have positive probability depending on
the prior distribution pi(h) on the secret, which is available at this time. The successors
of a random assignment state correspond to the bit being set to 0 or 1. In both cases
the probability of each successor state is computed and one of the successor states
with non-zero probability is chosen to be the next step in the analysis. Successors with
probability zero are dropped, pruning unreachable leaves from the trace tree.
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Because of the Markovian semantics, each state contains the information to compute
the probability distribution over its outgoing transitions. The probability of a trace is
computed as the product of the probabilities of the transitions composing the trace.
In the successor states of the conditional statement, H|g(L,H) (resp. H|¬g(L,H))
represents the assignment function obtained by removing from the sets of values assigned
to the private variables those values that contradict (resp. respect) the guard g(L,H).
Similarly, Pr(g(L,H)|pi(h)) (resp. Pr(¬g(L,H)|pi(h))) refers to the probability
that the guard g(L,H) is true (resp. false) considering the prior probability distribution
pi(h) on the private variables.
When the analysis of a single trace terminates, the corresponding final state (p¯c, L¯, H¯, p¯)
is produced, in which pc points to a return statement. The sets of allowed values
assigned to the private variables in H¯ have been appropriately reduced to account for the
conditional statements visited by the trace.
Depth-first Trace Exploration We perform a depth-first exhaustive exploration of the
execution traces of the system, starting from the initial state (1, ∅, ∅, 1). Each trace is
explored until it gets to a final state, then the final state gets added to the multiset Q of
final states. When a state with more than one successor is found during the exploration
of a trace, one of the successor states is chosen as the next state to explore and all other
successors are put on the stack of the states still to be explored, following a depth-first
strategy. When all traces have been explored, the full multiset of final states Q of the
system is produced. We then use Q to compute the posterior entropy of the system using
Algorithm 1 presented below. The leakage of the system is computed as the difference
between the prior and posterior entropy, as explained in Section 2.
Note that the exploration also depends on the prior distribution pi(h): values of the
secret with a probability zero in the prior distribution are not explored. This behavior is
intended, as is avoids unnecessarily exploring traces that have probability zero.
The depth-first exploration algorithm can be parallelized to take advantage of multi-
core architectures and is implemented in the current release of the QUAIL tool, available
at http://project.inria.fr/quail.
Posterior Uncertainty Computation We show how to compute the posterior uncer-
tainty U(pi(h|o)) of a system with a secret h and an observable o, given the uncertainty
measure U and a multiset Q of final states of the system. Q encodes the posterior
joint probability of all variables in the system and can be produced by the depth-first
exploration algorithm presented above.
Let (pc, L,H, p) be a final state in Q, where L represents the assignments of given
values to the public variables,H the assignments of sets of values to the private variables,
and p the joint probability of such assignments. Since different traces may produce
the same final assignments to variables (L,H), the joint probability of these assign-
ments is the sum of the probabilities of all such final states. To apply the formula (2)
U(pi(h|o)) = ∑o¯∈D(o) pi(o = o¯)U(pi(h|o = o¯)), we need to compute the marginal
probability distribution pi(o) and for each observable output o¯ ∈ D(o) s.t. pi(o = o¯) > 0
the corresponding conditional probability distribution on h, i.e. pi(h|o = o¯).
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Data: uncertainty measure U , multiset Q of final states
Result: posterior uncertainty U(pi(h|o))
1 Initialize pi(o) and all pi(h, o = o¯) to zero;
2 forall the s = (pc, L,H, p) ∈ Q do
3 Let o¯ = L(o), {k1, ..., kn} = H(h);
4 Set pi(o = o¯)← pi(o = o¯) + p;
5 for i = 1...n do
6 Set pi(h = ki, o = o¯)← pi(h = ki, o = o¯) + p/n;
7 end
8 end
9 For each o¯ ∈ D(o) let pi(h|o = o¯)← pi(h, o = o¯)/pi(o = o¯);
10 Return U(pi(h|o)) =∑o¯∈D(o) pi(o = o¯)U(pi(h|o = o¯))
Algorithm 1: Posterior uncertainty computation
Algorithm 1 computes pi(o) and each pi(h|o = o¯) by analyzing a multiset of final
states. For each state (pc, L,H, p) the value of the observable variable o and set of values
of the secret variable h are analyzed (lines 2-8). The probability of observing the value o¯
of the observable variable in the state is increased by p (line 4), and the probability of
observing each of the n values of the secret variable conditioned on o¯ is increased by
p/n (line 6). Finally, the probability on each subdistribution pi(h, o = o¯) is normalized
to 1 by dividing it by pi(o = o¯) to obtain the conditional probability pi(h|o = o¯) (line 9)
since P (X|Y ) = P (X,Y )/P (Y ).
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 terminates and outputs the posterior uncertainty U(pi(h|o))
of the posterior distribution represented by Q.
3.2 LeakWatch
LeakWatch [13] estimates the leakage of a Java program with secrets and observations by
running it several times for each possible value of the secret and inferring a probability
distribution on the observations for each secret. The tool automatically terminates
the analysis when the precision of the estimation is deemed sufficient, but different
termination conditions can be used.
For small secrets, LeakWatch reliably computes leakage of complex Java programs
with minimal interaction from the analyst. For larger secret, i.e. more than 10 bits,
LeakWatch takes more time to return a value.
However, the user can decide an acceptable error level for the tool to reduce the com-
putation time necessary to obtain an answer. Also, if the tool is terminated prematurely,
it can still provide an answer, even if it will be potentially quite imprecise. This makes
LeakWatch the only tool of the three considered that can always provide an answer in a
time-limited scenario, since QUAIL and Moped-QLeak generate a leakage result only if
they complete their execution.
Finally, LeakWatch provides many command-line options for tuning the analysis
parameters. In particular, one of the options displays the current estimation of the leakage
at regular intervals, which can be very useful when developing.
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Syntax and usage The syntax is the same as the Java language, with the additional
commands secret(name,value) to declare a secret with a given name and value,
and observe(value) to declare an observation of a given value. The analysis evalu-
ates how much information leaks from the secret to the observable values. In particular,
LeakWatch can compute leakage from a point of a program to another point of the
program, and not necessarily from the start to the termination of the program.
To run LeakWatch, a Java programa annotated with secret and observable
statements has to be compiled linking the LeakWatch library:
javac -cp leakwatch-0.5.jar:. MyClass.java
The tool is then run passing the name of the compiled class as a parameter:
java -jar leakwatch-0.5.jar MyClass
We have used the -n parameter to fix the number of executions of the program when we
experimented with different precisions and computation times. Normally LeakWatch
determines automatically when it has run enough executions. The tool returns its leakage
estimate for the Java program.
3.3 Moped-QLeak
Moped-QLeak [11] uses the Moped tool [16] to compute a symbolic Algebraic Decision
Diagram (ADD) representation of the summary of a program, which contains the relation
between the inputs and outputs of the program. Moped-QLeak then computes Shannon
or min-entropy leakage from this ADD representation using two algorithms introduced
by the authors. To obtain the ADD representation of the program, Moped basically
performs a fix-point iteration.
Moped’s ability to build a symbolic representation of a program depends on the
program’s complexity. When such representation is computed, Moped-QLeak computes
the information leakage with a small time overhead. On the other hand, some programs
are not easy to reduce to a symbolic representation, and in this case Moped-QLeak’s
computation does not terminate within a reasonable time.
The ADD-based representation of probability distributions in Moped-QLeak allows
the tool to model examples with large secret and observation spaces. In particular, the
authors test it with 32-bit secrets and observables, whereas QUAIL’s computation time
tends to be exponential in the size of the observables and LeakWatch’s in the size of the
secret. This suggests that the ADD approach is a key improvement on the state of the
art, allowing the analysis tools to analyze off-the-shelf programs using 32- and 64-bit
variables.
8
3.4 Syntax and usage
The tool analyzes programs written in a variant of Moped’s Remopla language. We
provide here a simplified version of the syntax used by Moped-QLeak.
stmt ::= skip ; | ident = exp; | pchoice (::prob->stmt)+ choicep
| do :: exp -> stmt :: else -> stmt od
| if :: exp -> stmt :: else -> stmt fi
The if and do constructs from Remopla, originally non-deterministic, have been made
deterministic in this version. The language has also been enriched with a probabilistic
choice operator, pchoice which allows the programmer to probablistically define the
next statement (e.g. by giving a probability prob to each statement). Remopla supports
loops, arrays and integers of arbitrary size. The language is normally used to encode
systems for model checking against temporal logics.
The language does not provide constructs to declare secrets and observables, but
assume that all global variables are at the same time secret and observable. More
precisely, the initial values are considered as the input and the final values as the output.
In practice, a variable is made secret by assigning it the same value in all final states.
Moped is executed on a Remopla file MyFile.rem by calling
mql -shannon MyFile.rem
where -shannon specifies that the tool will compute Shannon leakage. The tool returns
the leakage value for the Remopla program.
4 Case Studies
We evaluate the three tools described in the previous Section with two scalable case
studies. In order to compare them, we consider the following criteria:
Speed Evaluating the time required by the tool to provide a result;
Accuracy Evaluating the precision of the result returned by the tool;
Scalability Evaluating how the tool behaves on larger instances of the case studies;
Usability Evaluating how easy it is for the user to model a case study in the language
used by each tool and to run the analysis.
4.1 Case Study A: Smart Grids
A Smart Grid is an energy network where every node may produce, store and con-
sume energy. Nodes are called prosumers (PROducer consSUMERS). The Living
Lab demonstrator [21] is an instance of such a prosumer, whose data can be ac-
cessed online2. The prosumers periodically negotiate with an aggregator in charge
of balancing the consumption and production among several prosumers. Figure 2 de-
picts a grid with 3 prosumers. Each prosumer declares its plan, that is, how much
2 livinglab.fortiss.org
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it intends to consume or produce during the next period of time. The aggregator
sends back a value indicating the excess of energy production or consumption. An
excess of 0 indicates that the plans are feasible and terminates the negotiation. Oth-
erwise, the prosumers adapt their plan accordingly and send the updated version.
Aggregator
Prosumer 2Prosumer 1 Prosumer 3
plan
plan
plan
excess
excess
excess
Fig. 2: Smart grid overview
Smart grid and smart sensors raise sev-
eral security and privacy concerns. The
platform can ensure the information can-
not flow directly between prosumers [10].
However, stability requires a feedback
from the aggregator that potentially con-
veys infomation about other prosumer,
where only the software can limit information leakage. In general, knowing the con-
sumption of a particular household may reveal some sensitive information about the
house (presence of people in the house, type of electrical devices . . . ). Therefore, the
consumption of a prosumer should remain secret. The privacy of a prosumer with respect
to the aggregator can be ensured in several ways [28]. However, each prosumer receives
some information about the consumption of other prosumers through the excess value
sent back by the aggregator.
Table 1: Consumption of
houses wrt size
Size Case A Case B
Small 1 1
Medium 2 3
Large 3 5
An attacker might use the information obtained through
the grid in order to decide whether a given house is occupied
or not. In our scenario, we assume different types of houses
with different consumptions. Each house is modeled by a
private boolean value, which is true if the house is occupied.
An occupied house consumes a fixed amount of energy,
according to its type. An empty house does not consume anything. Table 1 presents how
much a given house consumes, in two different cases that we consider.
For this experiment, we assume that the attacker observes the global consumption
of the quarter. We consider different targets for the attack and thus different secrets.
Either the attacker targets a single house of a given type (i.e. S, M or L) and only the
bit corresponding to the presence in that house is secret, or the attacker wants to obtain
informations about all the houses and the whole array of bits indicating the presence in
each house is secret.
Usability We model the above scenario in the three tools. We consider two versions
depending on the target. When targeting all the houses, the secret is an array of boolean.
When targeting a single house, the secret is a single boolean, which is of course
supported by all the tools. However, the presence in the other houses is not a secret,
but still an unknown and unobservable input of the program. In QUAIL, the private
keyword allows the programmer to declare directly such variables. With LeakWatch, we
chose these values randomly but do not declare them as secret. In Moped-QLeak, we
choose these values randomly, as in LeakWatch.
The first two columns indicate the case, as presented in Table 1 and the number of
houses in the model. For a model with N houses, there are N/3 houses of each type.
The columns S, M and L indicates the leakage of the variable representing the presence
in a house of the corresponding type. The column “Global leakage” contains the leakage
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of the whole array of presence information bits and the column “Global leakage/bit”
indicates the average leak per bit of secret.
Table 2: Leakage of presence information through
the global consumption
Nb of Single house leakage Global Global
Case Houses S M L leakage leakage/bit
A 3 0.7500 0.7500 0.7500 2.7500 0.9166
A 6 0.0688 0.1466 0.2944 3.4210 0.5701
A 9 0.0214 0.0768 0.1771 3.7363 0.4151
A 12 0.0135 0.0544 0.1273 3.9479 0.3289
B 3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 3.0000 1.0000
B 6 0.1965 0.1965 0.3687 4.0243 0.6707
B 9 0.0241 0.0808 0.2062 4.3863 0.4873
B 12 0.0074 0.0510 0.1443 4.6064 0.3838
Table 3: Time to compute or ap-
proximate the leakage for a large
house
Case House Time Time Time
Nb QUAIL LW mql
A 3 0.1s 0.3s 0.02s
A 6 0.3s 0.3s 0.02s
A 9 0.6s 0.4s 0.02s
A 12 1.6s 0.4s 0.03s
B 3 0.2s 0.3s 0.02s
B 6 0.3s 0.5s 0.02s
B 9 0.6s 0.4s 0.02s
B 12 1.7s 0.4s 0.03s
In Case B with only 3 houses, the presence information can be deduced from the
global consumption information, which is indicated by a leakage of 1 for each presence
bit. Otherwise, the average leakage per bit from a global attack is more important that
the information obtained by focusing on a single house. This means than obtaining
information about the whole array, for instance the number of occupied houses, is easier
than obtaining information about a single bit, i.e. presence information of a single house.
In both cases, the leakage, and thus the loss of anonymity of prosumers, diminishes
when the number of houses increases.
Speed In Table 3 we show the time needed by QUAIL, LeakWatch and Moped-QLeak
for computing the leakage of the presence information in a house of size L. Moped-
QLeak takes around 20ms to compute this value, LeakWatch takes between 300 and 500
ms and QUAIL takes between 100 and 1700 ms, depending on the size of the model.
Furthermore, Moped-QLeak and QUAIL compute the exact leakage value, whereas
LeakWatch computes an approximation. For a more precise comparison, we need to take
precision into account.
Table 4: Average relative error over 100 runs and computation time for analyzing with
LeakWatch the leakage of the presence in a large house within 12 houses in Case B.
Simulations mql Default 1000 2000 QUAIL 5000 10000 20000 50000
Error 0% 14.0% 10.4% 6.4% 0% 4.8% 2.8% 2.1% 1.4%
Time 0.031s 0.4s 0.7s 1.0s 1.7s 2.1s 3.7s 6.9s 16.6s
Accuracy We compare QUAIL, LeakWatch and Moped-QLeak on computing the leakage
of the presence information information of a single large house, in Case B. QUAIL takes
1.7s to compute the exact leakage. With the default parameters, LeakWatch takes 0.4s to
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compute an approximation with a relative error of 14% (average on 100 runs). It requires
500 to 700 simulations. To compare execution times with respect to errors, we did an
additional experiment, where we requested LeakWatch to run more simulations. For
each requested number of simulations we provide in Table 4 the average relative error
(over 100 runs) and the time needed for the computation. We see that for an equivalent
amount of time, LeakWatch provides a result with a relative error of 4 to 6%, whereas
QUAIL returns the exact result. Moped-QLeak is the fastest and most precise.
Table 5: Maximal size analyzable
in one hour
Target LW QUAIL mql
L-size house 150000 27 234
All houses 15 12 150
Scalability Finally, we evaluate the scalability of
the tools by increasing the number of houses until
the analysis time reaches 1 hour. For this experi-
ment, we try to evaluate the leakage of the presence
information, in Case B, for a single house of size
L (1 bit of secret), or for all the houses simultane-
ously (N bit of secret). The results are shown in
Table 5. We see that LeakWatch can handle a very large number of houses when comput-
ing the leakage from a small secret, but is not much more scalable than QUAIL with a
large secret. Recall that LeakWatch provide an approximation of the leakage, whereas
QUAIL and Moped-QLeak provide the exact value. Moped-QLeak scales relatively well
with both a small and a large secret to analyze.
4.2 Case Study B: Voting Protocols
In an election, each voter is called to express his preference for the competing candidates.
The voting system defines the way the voters express their preference: either on paper in
a traditional election, or electronically in e-voting. After the votes have been cast, the
results of the vote are published, usually in an aggregated form to protect the anonymity
of the voters. Finally, the winning candidate or candidates is chosen according to a given
electoral formula.
In this section we present two different typologies of voting, representing two
different ways in which the voters can express their preference: in the Single Preference
protocol the voters declare their preference for exactly one of the candidates, while in
the Preference Ranking protocol each voter ranks the candidate from his most favorite to
his least favorite.
Single Preference The Single Preference protocol typology models all electoral for-
mulae in which each of the N voters expresses one vote for one of the C candidates,
including plurality and majority voting systems and single non-transferable vote [23].
The votes for each candidate are summed up and only the results are published, thus
hiding information about which voter voted for which candidate. The candidate or
candidates to be elected are decided according to the electoral formula used.
The secret is an array of integers with a value for each of the N voters. Each value
is a number from 0 to C − 1, representing a vote for one of the C candidates. The
observable is an array of integers with the votes obtained by each of the C candidates.
The protocol is simple, and its information leakage can be computed formally, as
shown by the following lemma:
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Lemma 1. The information leakage for the Single Preference protocol with n voters
and c candidates corresponds to
−
∑
k1+k2+...+kc=n
n!
cnk1!k2! . . . kc!
log2
(
n!
cnk1!k2! . . . kc!
)
The proof for Lemma 1 is in the Appendix. While the lemma provides a formula to
“manually” compute the leakage, it is very hard to find such a formula for an arbitrary
process. Therefore automated tools should be employed.
Preference Ranking The Preference Ranking protocol typology models all electoral
formulae in which each of the n voters expresses an order of preference of the c can-
didates, including the alternative vote and single transferable vote systems [23]. In the
Preferential Voting protocol the voter does not express a single vote, but rather a ranking
of the candidates; thus if the candidates are A, B, C and D the voter could express the fact
that he prefers B, then D, then C and finally A. Then each candidate gets c points for each
time he appears as first choice, c− 1 points for each time he appears as second choice,
and so on. The points of each candidate are summed up and the results are published.
The secret is an array of integers with a value for each of the N voters. Each value
is a number from 0 to C! − 1, representing one of the possible C! rankings of the C
candidates. The observable is an array of integers with the points obtained by each of the
C candidates. The full model for this protocol is shown in the Appendix due to space
constraints.
Table 6: Voting protocols: percent of secret leaked by Single Preference (on the left) and
Preference Ranking (on the right)
SP Candidates
2 3 4 5 6
Vo
te
rs
3 60.4 % 65.7 % 69.0 % 71.3 % 73.0 %
4 50.8 % 56.5 % 60.2 % 62.9 % 64.9 %
5 44.0 % 49.6 % 53.5 % 56.4 % 58.6 %
6 38.9 % 44.4 % 48.3 % 51.2 % 53.5 %
PR Candidates
2 3 4
Vo
te
rs
3 60.4 % 61.9 % 62.0 %
4 50.8 % 51.0 % timeout
5 44.0 % 43.4 % timeout
6 38.9 % 37.9 % timeout
Experimental Results
Usability We model the two voting systems, where the secret is the votes, and the
observable the results. In single preference voting, the secret is an array of integer
that represent individual votes. The range of this integer corresponds to the number of
candidate. In QUAIL, it is possible to declare the range of a secret integer. In LeakWatch,
each vote is drawn uniformly in the valid values and then declared secret. In Moped-
QLeak, this case requires more work. The range of a secret integer depends on the chosen
size bits. A special variable, out_of_domain, is set to true if one of the votes is not in
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the valid range and the corresponding input is not considered. Furthermore, when using
this variable, it’s not possible to use local variables, which complicates the modeling.
For the Preferential Voting, we were not able to produce a Moped-QLeak program
that terminates. We suspect that Moped is unable to compute a symbolic representation
of the Preferential Voting protocol due to its inherent complexity. Indeed, this program
decodes an integer betwen 0 and the factorial of the number of candidates into a sorted
list of the candidates, to assign the corresponding points to the candidates.
Table 7: Percent error of the leakage obtained by LeakWatch relatively to the exact value
for Single Preference (on the left) and Preference Ranking (on the right)
SP Candidates
2 3 4 5 6
Vo
te
rs
3 -3.8 % -3.7 % -3.2 % -2.8 % -2.2 %
4 -5.1 % -3.7 % -2.6 % -2.3 % -2.1 %
5 -5.0 % -3.2 % -2.6 % -2.2 % -1.9 %
6 -5.1 % -3.2 % -2.4 % timeout timeout
PR Candidates
2 3 4
Vo
te
rs
3 -3.8 % -2.6 % timeout
4 -5.1 % -2.6 % timeout
5 -5.0 % -2.2 % timeout
6 -5.1 % timeout timeout
Accuracy Table 6 shows the percentage of the secret leaked by the Single Preference
and Preference Ranking protocols for different numbers of voters and candidates. We
note that the results for 2 candidates are identical, since in this case in both protocols the
voters can vote in only 2 different ways. The results obtained for Single Preference are
correct with respect to the formula stated in Lemma 1. The table shows that the Single
Preference protocol leaks a greater percentage of its secret than the Preference Ranking
protocol.
Table 8: Time in seconds needed to compute the leakage for Single Preference with
QUAIL (left), LeakWatch (middle) and Moped-QLeak (right). Timeout is set to one hour.
SP Candidates
QUAIL 2 3 4 5 6
Vo
te
rs
3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8
4 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.6 2.7
5 0.3 0.9 2.5 6.8 13.3
6 0.5 2.8 13.3 56.7 214.4
SP Candidates
LW 2 3 4 5 6
Vo
te
rs
3 0.4 0.8 2.5 6.9 19.1
4 0.5 2.4 14.1 64.6 232.3
5 0.7 8.1 81.6 549.4 2688.3
6 1.1 29.0 481.6 to to
SP Candidates
mql 2 3 4 5 6
Vo
te
rs
3 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1
4 0.9 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.6
5 1.0 1.1 1.2 6.8 2.7
6 1.1 1.2 1.6 2.5 4.6
Table 7 shows the percent error of the leakage value obtained with LeakWatch.
Indeed, LeakWatch computes an approximation of the leakage based on simulation,
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whereas QUAIL and Moped-QLeak compute the exact value. Furthermore, the leak-
age computed by LeakWatch for a given program may change at each invocation of
the tool, because LeakWatch samples random executions. Here, LeakWatch slightly
underestimates the leakage, by 2 to 5%.
Speed We compare the execution time of the three tools in Table 8 for Single Preference
and in Table 9 for Preference Ranking. These execution times have been obtained on
a laptop with a i7 quad-core running at 3.3GHz and 16GB of RAM. The results show
that QUAIL is significantly faster than LeakWatch on these examples. This shows that
QUAIL performs better than LeakWatch with large secrets, in line with previous results
[5]. For single preference, Moped-QLeak clearly outperforms QUAIL on large examples.
The results for Moped-QLeak in the preferential voting case studies are missing from
Table 9 because the tool did not terminate in this case study, even with the smallest
instance of 2 voters and 2 candidates.
Table 9: Time in seconds needed to compute the leakage for Preference Ranking with
QUAIL (on the left) and LeakWatch (on the right). Timeout is set to one hour.
PR Candidates
QUAIL 2 3 4
Vo
te
rs
3 0.3 2.0 89.4
4 0.4 9.0 timeout
5 0.7 76.7 timeout
6 1.1 2987.8 timeout
PR Candidates
LW 2 3 4
Vo
te
rs
3 0.4 13.7 timeout
4 0.5 121.0 timeout
5 0.8 1267.3 timeout
6 1.2 timeout timeout
Scalability Concerning the Scalability, we see that QUAIL and Moped-Qleak are
more scalable than LeakWatch, since the latter times out in Tables 8 and 9. For Single
Preference, QUAIL stops at 7 voters and 6 candidates, due to an error. Moped-QLeak
finished with 12 voters and 6 candidates but returned -inf as leakage value, instead of
11. With 9 voters and 6 candidates, the result has approximately 1 bit of errors. Therefore,
we conjecture that the -inf value is a precision error. On these examples, no tool seems
to be much more scalable than the others, due to various reasons.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we provided two scalable case studies for the leakage computation and
used them for comparing the existing tools able to perform such an approximation. We
have compared the state of the art in information leakage tools – LeakWatch, QUAIL
and Moped-QLeak – on their speed, accuracy, scalability and usability in addressing the
case studies. We summarize here our observations and experience with the tools.
Speed Concerning the execution time, Moped-QLeak is usually the fastest tool in
providing an exact result. However, in the preferential voting example Moped-QLeak
was unable to terminate its analysis in less than one hour even for the smallest instances
of the problem. We can note that LeakWatch is faster than QUAIL on small secrets (e.g.
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1 bit) but QUAIL outperforms LeakWatch on larger secrets. Finally, LeakWatch is very
fast on small secrets, but its result and evaluation of the system (presence or absence of
leakage) tends to change between different executions of the tool.
Accuracy The tool giving the most accurate result is QUAIL because it supports arbitrary
precision. LeakWatch provides an approximated result and therefore is imprecise by
definition. Moped-QLeak does not implement arbitrary precision analysis, and con-
sequently suffers from approximation errors. For instance, we found an error in the
order of 1 bit on the majority voting protocol with 9 voters and 6 candidates, for which
we have the exact result. Also, for the same protocol with 12 voters and 6 candidates
Moped-QLeak reported a leakage of negative infinity bits, which we conjecture is caused
by approximation and division-by-zero errors in the computation.
Scalability For small secrets, LeakWatch scales better than the other tools analyzed. In
the Smart Grid case study, we managed to analyze the leakage for an aggregation of
150000 houses in less than one hour. However, this result has to be balanced with the fact
the returned result is obtained statistically, and varies from one execution to the other.
For large secrets, the winner is Moped-QLeak, as it scales much better than QUAIL
on the Smart Grid case study. However, for the voting protocol, QUAIL manages to
analyze only two voters less than Moped-QLeak (6 against 8), before approximation
issues make Moped-QLeak’s results incorrect.
Usability Since all the tools studied here are academic tools who are still in their early
years, usability is not necessarily the main concern of their developers. However, we
have found some important discrepancies in this area.
The most usable tool is LeakWatch, especially if the program to analyze is already
written in Java. In that case, it is sufficient to annotate the program in order to declare the
secrets and the observable values. Furthermore, LeakWatch has a command line option
to display the current results based on the traces collected so far, which is convenient
when the analysis time is very long.
QUAIL has its own language, which is an imperative WHILE language with arrays
and constants. QUAIL allows the explicitly declaration of variables as observable, public,
private or secret, with a specific range of allowed values. Furthermore, QUAIL has a
command-line option to change the values of constants declared in a program, which
comes in handy when performing batch experimentation.
Using Moped-QLeak has been more problematic because of some issues with the
Remopla language.In particular, the range of the secrets cannot be determined, instead
the program has to raise an out_of_domain exception when the values are not
in the expected range. Also, all integer variables have the same length, defined in the
DEFAULT_INT_BITS constant. Finally, some error messages are misleading, e.g. “The
first computed value is not a constant.” is output when a variable local to the main module
is declared and the out_of_domain variable is used. This issue is undocumented.
To conclude, Moped-QLeak is the fastest tool, because it uses a suitable data structure
(Algebraic Decision Diagrams) for representing the executions. However, this data
structure may become a problem with complex program, as shown by the preference
ranking example, which Moped-QLeak cannot analyze, contrarily to the other tools. The
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other tools, QUAIL and LeakWatch are more usable. QUAIL, which also has its own
dedicated language, provide some specific constructs for declaring the visibility and
range of a variable. We believe that reimplementing QUAIL with a better data structure
for probability distributions, like the ADDs used in Moped-QLeak, would provide a fast
and usable tool for performing leakage analysis.
6 Related Tools
We discuss some security-related automated tools and their relation with the work
presented in this paper.
The STA tool developed by Boreale et al. [7] is similar in intent to the algorithms we
propose, since it also uses symbolic trace analysis. More recent work by Boreale et al.
[8] introduces a semiring-based semantics able to perform compositional quantitative
analysis of non-deterministic systems, but no tool is available at the moment.
Efficient tools have been developed by Phan and Malacaria for information-theoretical
analysis of systems. The tools squifc [24], QILURA [25], and jpf-qif [26] use SMT solv-
ing to perform a symbolic analysis of C or Java code and to compute channel capacity of
programs, where the channel capacity is the maximum information leakage achievable
for any prior distribution over the secret and randomness of the system. Since the tools
compute channel capacity and not Shannon leakage of randomized systems, they have
not been included in our comparison.
McCamant et al. have obtained interesting results in detecting leakage of informa-
tion by implicit flow by applying dynamic and quantitative taint analysis techniques
[19,22]. Again, their techniques have not been included in this evaluation since they do
not compute information-theoretical leakage measures like Shannon and min-entropy
leakage.
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A Appendix
Proof (of Theorem 1). Termination of Algorithm 1 is trivial if Q is finite. For the
soundness, the algorithm computes posterior uncertainty according to the uncertainty
measure U using the formula
U(pi(h|o)) =
∑
o¯∈D(o)
pi(o = o¯)U(pi(h|o = o¯))
The computation reduces to finding the probability distribution pi(o) on the observable
variable and the conditional probability distribution on the secret pi(h|o = o¯) for each
possible value o¯ of the observable variable.
Let Qo¯ be the set {(pc, L,H, p) ∈ Q | L(o) = o¯}, and let p(Qo¯) be the sum of the
probabilities p of the states in Qo¯. Then pi(o = o¯) = p(Qo¯). Since the sets Qo¯ for each
o¯ form a partition of Q, then
∑
o¯∈D(o) p(Qo¯) =
∑
o¯∈D(o) pi(o = o¯) = 1, proving that
pi(o) is a probability distribution.
Similarly, let h¯ = {k1, . . . , kn} and Qo¯,h¯ be the set {(pc, L,H, p) ∈ Qo¯ | H(h) =
h¯} and let p(Qo¯,h¯) be the sum of the probabilities p of the states in Qo¯,h¯. Then each state
inQo¯,h¯ represents a fragment of the the joint distribution on (o, h) that is uniform on h¯ =
{k1, ..., kn}, and pi(o = o¯, h ∈ {k1, ..., kn}) = p(Qo¯,h¯). The conditional probability of
each value of h conditioned by a given o¯ ∈ D(o) is computed as pi(h|o = o¯) = pi(o=o¯,h)pi(o=o¯)
by the normalization in line 9.
Having computed pi(o) and all pi(h|o = o¯), we compute posterior uncertainty with
the formula presented above.
Lemma 1: The information leakage for the Single Preference protocol with n voters
and c candidates corresponds to
−
∑
k1+k2+...+kc=n
n!
cnk1!k2! . . . kc!
log2
(
n!
cnk1!k2! . . . kc!
)
Proof. It is known that, since the program is deterministic, its Shannon leakage corre-
sponds to the entropy H(pi(o)) of the distribution over the output [3]. We compute
H(pi(o)) = −
∑
o∈D(o)
pi(o) log2(pi(o))
Here o corresponds to a possible output, which is, in our case a vote result. A vote result
precises, for each candidate j, the number kj of votes obtained. Furthermore, the total
of all votes is the number of voters v. Thus the domain of o is D(o) = {k1, . . . , kc ∈
N |∑cj=1 kj = n}. The number of votes with result o = k1, . . . , kc corresponds to the
number of choices of voters for candidate 1 amongst n, i.e.
(
n
k1
)
, times the number of
choice of voters for candidate 2 amongst the ones remaining i.e.
(
n−k1
k2
)
and so on. The
result is
c∏
i=1
(
n−∑i−1j=1 kj
ki
)
which simplifies to n!k1!k2!...kc! . As the votes are equiprobable, we have p(k1, . . . , kc) =
n!
cnk1!k2!...kc!
, hence the result.
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B Code of our case studies
B.1 Smart Grid Case Study
Guessing Presence in a single House
QUAIL version:
1 // N is the total number of houses
2 const N:=12;
3
4 // indicates the size of the target. Only one of those should
be one and all the other 0.
5 const target_is_S := 0 ;
6 const target_is_M := 0 ;
7 const target_is_L := 1 ;
8
9 // We consider different sizes of houses. S, M and L indicate
the number of houses of each size, excluding the one
chosen for the attack
10 const S:=N/3 - target_is_S ;
11 const M:=N/3 - target_is_M ;
12 const L:=N/3 - target_is_L ;
13
14 // each size correspond to a different level of consumption
15 const small_consumption := 1 ;
16 const medium_consumption := 3 ;
17 const large_consumption := 5 ;
18
19 // the observable is the global consumption of the system
20 observable int32 global_consumption :=0 ;
21
22 // The secret is the consumption of one particular house
23 secret int1 presence_target:=[0,1];
24 private array [N-1] of int1 presence:=[0,1];
25
26 public int32 i := 0;
27
28 if (presence_target == 1) then
29 if (target_is_S == 1) then
30 assign global_consumption:= global_consumption +
small_consumption ;
31 elif (target_is_M == 1) then
32 assign global_consumption:= global_consumption +
medium_consumption ;
33 else
34 assign global_consumption:= global_consumption +
large_consumption ;
35 fi
36 fi
37
20
38 while ( i < N-1) do
39 if (presence[i] == 1) then
40 if (i<S) then
41 assign global_consumption:= global_consumption +
small_consumption ;
42 elif (i<S+M) then
43 assign global_consumption:= global_consumption +
medium_consumption ;
44 else
45 assign global_consumption:= global_consumption +
large_consumption ;
46 fi
47 fi
48 assign i:= i + 1 ;
49 od
50 return;
LeakWatch version:
1 import bham.leakwatch.LeakWatchAPI;
2 import java.security.SecureRandom;
3
4 public class TargetInfo {
5
6 // N is the total number of houses
7 static int N=12;
8
9 // indicates the size of the target. Only one of those
should be one and all the other 0.
10 static int target_is_S = 0 ;
11 static int target_is_M = 0 ;
12 static int target_is_L = 1 ;
13
14 // We consider different sizes of houses. S, M and L
indicate the number of houses of each size.
15 static int S=N/3 - target_is_S ;
16 static int M=N/3 - target_is_M ;
17 static int L=N/3 - target_is_L ;
18
19 // each size correspond to a different level of consumption
20 static int small_consumption = 1 ;
21 static int medium_consumption = 3 ;
22 static int large_consumption = 5 ;
23
24 // the observable is the global consumption of the system
25 static int global_consumption =0 ;
26
27 // the presence of people in each house
28 static int[] presence;
29 // the secret is the presence
21
30 static int presence_target;
31
32 static void initPublicValues(String[] args) {
33 // parses command line to set parameters
34 }
35
36 static void initPrivateValues() {
37 SecureRandom rand = new SecureRandom();
38 presence = new int[N-1];
39 for(int i =0; i<N-1 ; i++){
40 presence[i]=rand.nextInt(2);
41 }
42 presence_target=rand.nextInt(2);
43 LeakWatchAPI.secret("presence_target",presence_target);
44 }
45
46
47 public static void main(String[] args){
48 initPublicValues(args);
49 // init private values in the intervals defined in QUAIL
file
50 initPrivateValues();
51 if (presence_target == 1) {
52 if (target_is_S == 1) {
53 global_consumption= global_consumption +
small_consumption ;
54 }
55 else if (target_is_M == 1) {
56 global_consumption= global_consumption +
medium_consumption ;
57 }
58 else {
59 global_consumption= global_consumption +
large_consumption ;
60 }
61 }
62
63 int i = 0;
64 while ( i < N-1) {
65 if (presence[i] == 1) {
66 if (i<S) {
67 global_consumption = global_consumption +
small_consumption ;
68 }
69 else if (i<S+M) {
70 global_consumption = global_consumption +
medium_consumption ;
71 }
72 else{
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73 global_consumption = global_consumption +
large_consumption ;
74 }
75 }
76 i= i + 1;
77 }
78 LeakWatchAPI.observe(global_consumption);
79 }
80
81 }
Moped-QLeak version:
1 // we use 16 bits integers
2 define DEFAULT_INT_BITS 16
3
4 // N is the total number of houses
5 define N 12
6
7 // consumptions of houses according to their size
8 define CONS_S 1
9 define CONS_M 3
10 define CONS_L 5
11
12 // We consider different sizes of houses. S, M and L indicate
the number of houses of each size.
13 define S N/3
14 define M N/3
15 define L N-(S+M)-1
16
17 // The secret is the presence of a house of size L
18 bool presence;
19
20 // the observable is the global consumption of the system
21 int global_consumption;
22
23 module void main(){
24 int i;
25
26 // set global consumption to 0: ignore prior value
27 global_consumption = 0;
28
29 if
30 :: presence -> global_consumption = global_consumption +
CONS_L;
31 :: else -> skip;
32 fi
33
34 i=0;
35 do
23
36 :: i<S -> pchoice
37 :: 0.5 -> global_consumption = global_consumption
+ CONS_S;
38 :: 0.5 -> skip;
39 choicep
40 i=i+1;
41 od
42
43 i=0;
44 do
45 :: i<M -> pchoice
46 :: 0.5 -> global_consumption = global_consumption
+ CONS_M;
47 :: 0.5 -> skip;
48 choicep
49 i=i+1;
50 od
51
52 i=0;
53 do
54 :: i<L -> pchoice
55 :: 0.5 -> global_consumption = global_consumption
+ CONS_L;
56 :: 0.5 -> skip;
57 choicep
58 i=i+1;
59 od
60 // hide the secret input
61 presence = false ;
62 }
Guessing Presence in all the Houses
QUAIL version:
1 // N is the total number of houses
2 const N:=12;
3
4 // We consider different sizes of houses. S, M and L indicate
the number of houses of each size.
5 const S:=N/3 ;
6 const M:=N/3 ;
7 const L:=N-S-M ;
8
9 // each size correspond to a different level of consumption
10 const small_consumption := 1 ;
11 const medium_consumption := 3 ;
12 const large_consumption := 5 ;
13
24
14 // the observable is the global consumption of the system
15 observable int32 global_consumption :=0 ;
16
17 // The secret is the presence of people in each hose
18 secret array [N] of int1 presence:=[0,1];
19
20 public int32 i := 0;
21
22 while ( i < N) do
23 if (presence[i] == 1) then
24 if (i<S) then
25 assign global_consumption:= global_consumption +
small_consumption ;
26 elif (i<S+M) then
27 assign global_consumption:= global_consumption +
medium_consumption ;
28 else
29 assign global_consumption:= global_consumption +
large_consumption ;
30 fi
31 fi
32 assign i:= i + 1 ;
33 od
34 return;
LeakWatch version:
1 import bham.leakwatch.LeakWatchAPI;
2 import java.security.SecureRandom;
3
4 public class GlobalInfo {
5
6 // N is the total number of houses
7 static int N=12;
8
9 // We consider different sizes of houses. S, M and L
indicate the number of houses of each size.
10 static int S=N/3 ;
11 static int M=N/3 ;
12 static int L=N-S-M ;
13
14 // each size correspond to a different level of consumption
15 static int small_consumption = 1 ;
16 static int medium_consumption = 3 ;
17 static int large_consumption = 5 ;
18
19 // the observable is the global consumption of the system
20 static int global_consumption =0 ;
21
22 // The secret is the presence of people in each hose
25
23 static int[] presence;
24
25 static void initPublicValues(String[] args) {
26 // parse commandline to get parameters
27 }
28
29 static void initPrivateValues() {
30 SecureRandom rand = new SecureRandom();
31 // secret var is used to sumarize the table in an int
32 int secret_var = 0;
33
34 presence = new int[N];
35 for(int i =0; i<N ; i++){
36 presence[i]=rand.nextInt(2);
37 secret_var=2*secret_var + presence[i];
38 }
39 LeakWatchAPI.secret("secret_var",secret_var);
40 }
41
42
43 public static void main(String[] args){
44 initPublicValues(args);
45 // init private values in the intervals defined in QUAIL
file
46 initPrivateValues();
47
48 int i = 0;
49 while ( i < N) {
50 if (presence[i] == 1) {
51 if (i<S) {
52 global_consumption = global_consumption +
small_consumption ;
53 }
54 else if (i<S+M) {
55 global_consumption = global_consumption +
medium_consumption ;
56 }
57 else{
58 global_consumption = global_consumption +
large_consumption ;
59 }
60 }
61 i= i + 1;
62 }
63 LeakWatchAPI.observe(global_consumption);
64 }
65
66 }
26
Moped-QLeak version:
1 // we use 16 bits integers
2 define DEFAULT_INT_BITS 16
3
4 // N is the total number of houses
5 define N 12
6
7 // consumptions of houses according to their size
8 define CONS_S 1
9 define CONS_M 3
10 define CONS_L 5
11
12 // We consider different sizes of houses. S, M and L indicate
the number of houses of each size.
13 define S N/3
14 define M N/3
15 define L N-(S+M)
16
17 // The secret is the presence of people in each house
18 bool presence[N];
19
20 // the observable is the global consumption of the system
21 int global_consumption;
22
23 module void main(){
24 int i;
25
26 // set global consumption to 0: ignore prior value
27 global_consumption = 0;
28
29 i=0;
30 do
31 :: i<N -> if
32 :: presence[i] ->
33 if
34 :: i<S -> global_consumption =
global_consumption + CONS_S;
35 :: else -> if
36 :: i<S+M -> global_consumption =
global_consumption + CONS_M;
37 :: else -> global_consumption =
global_consumption + CONS_L;
38 fi
39 fi
40 :: else -> skip;
41 fi
42 i=i+1;
43 od
44
27
45
46 // hide the secret input
47 i=0;
48 do
49 :: i <N -> presence[i] = false;
50 i=i+1;
51 od
52 }
B.2 Voting Case Study
Single Preference
QUAIL version:
1 // N is the number of voters
2 const N:=3;
3
4 // C is the number of candidates
5 const C:=2;
6
7 // the result is the number of votes of each candidate
8 observable array [C] of int32 result;
9
10 // The secret is the preference of each voter
11 secret array [N] of int32 vote:=[0,C-1];
12
13 // this is just a counter
14 public int32 i:=0;
15 public int32 j:=0;
16 // voting
17 while (i<N) do
18 while (j<C) do
19 if (vote[i]==j) then
20 assign result[j]:=result[j]+1;
21 fi
22 assign j:=j+1;
23 od
24 assign j:=0;
25 assign i:=i+1;
26 od
27
28 return;
LeakWatch version:
1 import bham.leakwatch.LeakWatchAPI;
2 import java.security.SecureRandom;
3
4 public class MajorityVoting {
28
5 // N is the number of voters
6 public static int N=3;
7
8 // C is the number of candidates
9 public static int C=2;
10 // the result is the number of votes of each candidate
11 static int[] result;
12
13 // The secret is the preference of each voter
14 static int[] vote;
15
16
17 static void initPublicValues(String[] args) {
18 N=Integer.parseInt(args[0]);
19 C=Integer.parseInt(args[1]);
20
21 result = new int[C];
22 for (int i=0 ; i<C ; i++) result[i] = 0;
23 }
24
25 static void initPrivateValues() {
26 SecureRandom rand = new SecureRandom();
27
28 vote = new int[N];
29 for(int i =0; i<N ; i++){
30 vote[i]=rand.nextInt(C);
31 LeakWatchAPI.secret("vote[i]",vote[i]);
32 }
33 }
34
35 public static void main(String[] args){
36 initPublicValues(args);
37 // init private values in the intervals defined in QUAIL
file
38 initPrivateValues();
39
40 int i = 0;
41 int j = 0;
42 while (i < N) {
43 j=0;
44 while (j < C) {
45 if (vote[i] == j) {
46 result[j] = result[j] + 1 ;
47 }
48 j= j+1;
49 }
50 i= i + 1;
51 }
52 for(j=0; j<C ; j++) LeakWatchAPI.observe(result[j]);
53 }
29
54 }
Moped-QLeak version:
1 define DEFAULT_INT_BITS 8
2
3 // N is the number of voters
4 define N 3
5
6 // C is the number of candidates
7 define C 2
8
9 // the result is the number of votes for each candidate
10 int result[C];
11
12 // The secret is the preference of each voter
13 int vote[N];
14
15 // to restrict the domain
16 bool out_of_domain;
17
18 int i; //loop counter
19 int j; //vote index
20
21 module void main() {
22 if
23 :: E k (0,N-1) vote[k]>=C -> out_of_domain = true; //
discard invalid votes value
24 :: else ->
25 i=0;
26
27 do
28 :: i<C ->
29 result[i] = 0; //set score to zero (result is an
output)
30 i=i+1;
31 od
32
33 i=0;
34 do
35 :: i<N ->
36 j=vote[i];
37 result[j] = result[j] + 1; //result[vote[i]] does not
work
38 // hide secret
39 vote[i]=C;
40 i=i+1;
41 od
42
43 i=0;
30
44 j=0;
45 fi
46 }
Preference Ranking
QUAIL version:
1 // N is the number of voters
2 const N:=3;
3
4 // C is the number of candidates
5 const C:=2;
6
7 // CFACT is C factorial (until we implement factorials in
QUAIL)
8 const CFACT:=4;
9
10 // the result is the number of votes of each candidate
11 observable array [C] of int32 result;
12
13 // The secret is the preference of each voter, from 0 to C!-1
14 secret array [N] of int32 vote:=[0,CFACT-1];
15
16 // these bits represent the votes received by the voting
machine
17 public array [N] of int32 decl;
18
19 public array [C] of int32 temparray;
20 public int32 pos;
21 // this is just a counter
22
23 public int32 voter:=0;
24 public int32 candidate:=0;
25 public int32 k:=0;
26 public int32 y:=0;
27
28 // voting
29 while (voter<N) do
30 while (candidate<CFACT) do
31 if (vote[voter]==candidate) then
32 assign decl[voter]:=candidate;
33 fi
34 assign candidate:=candidate+1;
35 od
36 assign candidate:=0;
37 assign voter:=voter+1;
38 od
39
31
40 // transform the secret of each voter into the order of the
preferences
41 assign voter:=0;
42 while (voter<N) do
43
44 // build the initial array
45 assign candidate:=0;
46 while (candidate<C) do
47 assign temparray[candidate]:=candidate;
48 assign candidate:=candidate+1;
49 od
50
51 assign k:=C;
52 // find a position
53 while (k>0) do
54 assign pos := decl[voter]%k;
55 assign candidate:=C-k;
56 // update the vote of the candidate
57 assign result[candidate]:=result[candidate]+temparray[pos
];
58
59 // remove the element from the array
60 assign y:=pos;
61 while (y<C-1) do
62 assign temparray[y]:=temparray[y+1];
63 assign y:=y+1;
64 od
65
66 // update the vote of the voter
67 assign decl[voter]:=decl[voter]/k;
68
69 // decrease the counter
70 assign k:=k-1;
71 od
72 assign voter:=voter+1;
73 od
74 // calculate the results
75 return;
LeakWatch version:
1 import bham.leakwatch.LeakWatchAPI;
2 import java.security.SecureRandom;
3
4 public class PreferentialVoting {
5 // N is the number of voters
6 public static int N=3;
7
8 // C is the number of candidates
9 public static int C=2;
32
10 // the result is the number of votes of each candidate
11 static int[] result;
12
13 // The secret is the preference of each voter
14 static int[] vote;
15
16
17 static int[] decl;
18 static int[] temparray;
19
20 static int fact(int n){
21 if (n <= 1)
22 return 1;
23 else
24 return n*fact(n-1);
25 }
26
27 static void initPublicValues(String[] args) {
28 if (args.length < 2) {
29 System.out.println("Usage: PreferentialVoting <
nb_voters> <nb_candidates>");
30 System.exit(1);
31 }
32 N=Integer.parseInt(args[0]);
33 C=Integer.parseInt(args[1]);
34
35 result = new int[C];
36 for (int i=0 ; i<C ; i++) result[i] = 0;
37 }
38
39 static void initPrivateValues() {
40 SecureRandom rand = new SecureRandom();
41
42 vote = new int[N];
43 int CFACT= fact(C);
44 for(int i =0; i<N ; i++){
45 vote[i]=rand.nextInt(CFACT);
46 LeakWatchAPI.secret("vote[i]",vote[i]);
47 }
48
49 /*other_votes = new int[N-S];
50 for(int i =0; i<N-S ; i++){
51 other_votes[i]=rand.nextInt(C);
52 }*/
53 }
54
55 public static void main(String[] args){
56 initPublicValues(args);
57 // init private values in the intervals defined in QUAIL
file
33
58 initPrivateValues();
59
60 int voter = 0;
61 int vote_val = 0;
62 decl=new int[N];
63 // voting
64 while (voter<N) {
65 while (vote_val<fact(C)) {
66 if (vote[voter]==vote_val) {
67 decl[voter]=vote_val;
68 }
69 vote_val=vote_val+1;
70 }
71 vote_val=0;
72 voter=voter+1;
73 }
74
75 // transform the secret of each voter into the order of
the preferences
76 voter=0;
77 while (voter<N) {
78
79 // build the initial array
80 int candidate=0;
81 temparray = new int[C];
82 while (candidate<C){
83 temparray[candidate]=candidate;
84 candidate=candidate+1;
85 }
86
87 int k=C;
88 // find a position
89 while (k>0) {
90 int pos = decl[voter]%k;
91 candidate=C-k;
92 // update the vote of the candidate
93 result[candidate]=result[candidate]+temparray[pos];
94
95 // remove the element from the array
96 int y=pos;
97 while (y<C-1) {
98 temparray[y]=temparray[y+1];
99 y=y+1;
100 }
101
102 // update the vote of the voter
103 decl[voter]=decl[voter]/k;
104
105 // decrease the counter
106 k=k-1;
34
107 }
108 voter=voter+1;
109 }
110 for (int j=0; j<C ; j++){
111 LeakWatchAPI.observe(result[j]);
112 }
113 }
114 }
The non working version of preferential voting: this program is parsed correctly, but
the analysis does not terminate, even after 3 hours.
1 define DEFAULT_INT_BITS 8
2
3 // N voters C candidates
4 define C 2
5 define N 2
6 // CFACT is C factorial
7 define CFACT 2
8
9 //votes are secret
10 //results are observable
11 unsigned int vote[N];
12 unsigned int result[C];
13
14 bool out_of_domain;
15
16 // intermediate variables
17 int temparray[C];
18 int i,j;
19 int pos;
20
21 module void main() {
22 if
23 :: E k (0,N-1) vote[k] >= CFACT -> out_of_domain = true;
// discard invalid votes value
24 :: else ->
25
26 // set results to 0
27 i=0;
28 do
29 :: i<C -> result[i] = 0;
30 i=i+1;
31 od
32
33 i=0;
34 do
35 :: i< N -> //
36 j=0;
37 do
35
38 :: j<C -> temparray[j]=j;
39 j=j+1;
40 od
41 j=C; //not really necessary
42 do
43 :: j > 0 ->
44 pos = vote[i] - (vote[i]/j)*j; // pos = vote[i
] % j
45 result[C-j] = result[C-j] + temparray[pos];
46 do
47 :: pos < C-1 -> temparray[pos] = temparray[pos
+ 1];
48 pos=pos + 1;
49 od
50 vote[i]=vote[i]/j;
51 j=j-1;
52 od
53 vote[i]=0; //forget vote[i]
54 i=i+1;
55 od
56
57 // forget intermediate values
58 pos=0;
59 do
60 :: pos<C -> temparray[pos] = 0;
61 pos=pos+1;
62 od
63 i=0;
64 fi //close the main if
65 }
36
